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TAKING CONVERSATION, DIALOGUE,
AND THERAPY PUBLIC
MARI BOOR TONN
This essay interrogates “conversation,” “dialogue,” and the language of therapy as
framing devices for various public deliberative processes in the 1990s and since.
Although “conversation” and “dialogue” are often trumpeted as a means to restore
civility, egalitarianism, and community into the public sphere, this essay argues
that these communication modes, coupled with the language of therapy in which
they frequently have been couched, are problematic as paradigms for conflict and
problem resolution on public issues. The essay argues, first, that a conversational
model for deliberation may impede rather than further democratic goals, and,
second, that conversation may function as a therapeutic substitute for policy formation necessary to remedy social ills.

s the last century neared its close, the second-wave feminist slogan “The
Personal Is Political” was turned on its head: the political became highly
personalized. In this new politics of intimacy, candidates whistlestopped on
Oprah Winfrey, political journalists posed as psychotherapists, and President “I
feel your pain” Clinton presided in the popular imagination as The Great
Empathizer and the Commander in Grief. Emblematic of this conflation of
the private and the public was the increasing casting of social controversies
such as affirmative action, escalating crime, and welfare reform in the language of “conversation,” “dialogue,” and the therapeutic talk of healing, dysfunction, coping, self-esteem, and empowerment.1
Among academics, this cult of conversation has been championed most
ardently by communitarian political theorists, civic journalists, cultural feminists, postmodernists, multiculturalists, family therapists, and a number of
communication scholars concerned with identity, the public sphere, conflict and
negotiation, and counseling. In many cases, the rationale for a conversational
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turn in the ways citizens conduct business, solve problems, and approach conflict is couched in a language interpolating “conversation” or “dialogue” with
spirituality and therapy. Particularly visible is Deborah Tannen’s 1998 bestseller
The Argument Culture: Moving from Debate to Dialogue, wherein she blames a
culture of critique for “corroding our spirit.”2 Likewise, the earlier The
Conversation of Journalism proposed supplanting the “disabling” monological
approach to news reporting with a more inclusive dialogic paradigm overtly
engaging citizens.3 So, too, at the University of New Hampshire in the late 1990s,
administrators and some faculty proposed replacing the existing Academic
Senate, which they termed “dysfunctional,” with a nonvoting University Forum
aimed to “advance functional conversation” and attendant community.4 And the
conflation of the conversational and therapeutic for approaching public controversies is made explicit in the Boston Public Conversations Project, premised on
“[t]he idea that family therapy skills can be fruitfully applied in the realm of
‘public conversations’” on “divisive public issues” such as abortion.5
Perhaps the most conspicuous effort at replacing public debate with therapeutic dialogue was President Clinton’s Conversation on Race, launched in
mid-1997. Controversial from its inception for its ideological bent, the initiative met further widespread criticism for its encounter-group approaches to
racial stratification and strife, critiques echoing previously articulated concerns—my own among them6—that certain dangers lurk in employing private
or social communication modes for public problem-solving.7 Since then, others have joined in contesting the treating of public problems with narrative
and psychological approaches, which—in the name of promoting civility,
cooperation, personal empowerment, and socially constructed or idiosyncratic truths—actually work to contain dissent, locate systemic social problems solely within individual neurosis, and otherwise fortify hegemony.8
Particularly noteworthy is Michael Schudson’s challenge to the utopian
equating of “conversation” with the “soul of democracy.” Schudson points to
pivotal differences in the goals and architecture of conversational and democratic deliberative processes. To him, political (or democratic) conversation is a
contradiction in terms. Political deliberation entails a clear instrumental purpose, ideally remaining ever mindful of its implications beyond an individual
case. Marked by disagreement—even pain—democratic deliberation contains
transparent prescribed procedures governing participation and decision making so as to protect the timid or otherwise weak. In such processes, written
records chronicle the interactional journey toward resolution, and in the case
of writing law especially, provide accessible justification for decisions rendered. In sharp contrast, conversation is often “small talk” exchanged among
family, friends, or candidates for intimacy, unbridled by set agendas, and
prone to egocentric rather than altruistic goals. Subject only to unstated
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“rules” such as turn-taking and politeness, conversation tends to advantage the
gregarious or articulate over the shy or slight of tongue.9
The events of 9/11, the onset of war with Afghanistan and Iraq, and the
subsequent failure to locate Iraqi weapons of mass destruction have resuscitated some faith in debate, argument, warrant, and facts as crucial to the public sphere. Still, the romance with public conversation persists. As examples
among communication scholars, Karlyn Kohrs Campbell’s 2001 Carroll C.
Arnold Distinguished Lecture treated what she termed “the rhetoric of conversation” as a means to “manage controversy” and empower non-dominant
voices10; multiple essays in a 2002 special issue of Rhetoric & Public Affairs on
deliberative democracy couch a deliberative democratic ideal in dialogic
terms11; and the 2005 Southern States Communication Convention featured
family therapist Sallyann Roth, founding member and trainer of the Public
Conversations Project, as keynote speaker.12 Representative of the dialogic turn
in deliberative democracy scholarship is Gerard A. Hauser and Chantal
Benoit-Barne’s critique of the traditional procedural, reasoning model of public problem solving: “A deliberative model of democracy . . . constru[es]
democracy in terms of participation in the ongoing conversation about how we
shall act and interact—our political relations” and “Civil society redirects our
attention to the language of social dialogue on which our understanding of
political interests and possibility rests.”13 And on the political front, British
Prime Minister Tony Blair—facing declining poll numbers and mounting criticism of his indifference to public opinion on issues ranging from the Iraq war
to steep tuition hike proposals—launched The Big Conversation on November
28, 2003. Trumpeted as “as way of enriching the Labour Party’s policy making
process by listening to the British public about their priorities,” the initiative
includes an interactive government website and community meetings ostensibly designed to solicit citizens’ voices on public issues.14 In their own way, each
treatment of public conversation positions it as a democratic good, a mode
that heals divisions and carves out spaces wherein ordinary voices can be
heard.
In certain ways, Schudson’s initial reluctance to dismiss public conversation
echoes my own early reservations, given the ideals of egalitarianism, empowerment, and mutual respect conversational advocates champion. Still, in the
spirit of the dialectic ostensibly underlying dialogic premises, this essay argues
that various negative consequences can result from transporting conversational and therapeutic paradigms into public problem solving. In what follows, I extend Schudson’s critique of a conversational model for democracy in
two ways: First, whereas Schudson primarily offers a theoretical analysis, I
interrogate public conversation as a praxis in a variety of venues, illustrating
how public “conversation” and “dialogue” have been coopted to silence rather
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than empower marginalized or dissenting voices. In practice, public conversation easily can emulate what feminist political scientist Jo Freeman termed
“the tyranny of structurelessness” in her classic 1970 critique of consciousness-raising groups in the women’s liberation movement,15 as well as the key
traits Irving L. Janis ascribes to “groupthink.”16 Thus, contrary to its promotion as a means to neutralize hierarchy and exclusion in the public sphere,
public conversation can and has accomplished the reverse. When such moves
are rendered transparent, public conversation and dialogue, I contend, risk
increasing rather than diminishing political cynicism and alienation.
Second, whereas Schudson focuses largely on ways a conversational model
for democracy may mute an individual’s voice in crafting a resolution on a
given question at a given time, I draw upon insights of Dana L. Cloud and others to consider ways in which a therapeutic, conversational approach to public
problems can stymie productive, collective action in two respects.17 First,
because conversation has no clearly defined goal, a public conversation may
engender inertia as participants become mired in repeated airings of personal
experiences without a mechanism to lend such expressions direction and closure. As Freeman aptly notes, although “[u]nstructured groups may be very
effective in getting [people] to talk about their lives[,] they aren’t very good for
getting things done. Unless their mode of operation changes, groups flounder
at the point where people tire of ‘just talking.’”18 Second, because the therapeutic bent of much public conversation locates social ills and remedies within
individuals or dynamics of interpersonal relationships, public conversations
and dialogues risk becoming substitutes for policy formation necessary to correct structural dimensions of social problems. In mimicking the emphasis on
the individual in therapy, Cloud warns, the therapeutic rhetoric of “healing,
consolation, and adaptation or adjustment” tends to “encourage citizens to
perceive political issues, conflicts, and inequities as personal failures subject to
personal amelioration.”19

SOCIAL CONVERSATION, THERAPY, AND PUBLIC DELIBERATION
The allure of conversation or dialogue to remedy corrosive political alienation
and disaffection undoubtedly lies in social talk as a primary site for locating a
sense of self, creating and performing social identity, and developing and sustaining relationships.20 On its face, conversation appears less threatening than
traditional modes of public deliberation in several respects. First, conventional
conceptions of expertise are significantly refigured in social conversations. In
social settings, evidence often consists of lived experiences, hearsay, anecdotes,
and personal feelings and opinions rather than, for example, statistics or studied conclusions from authorities. Moreover, because social conversations fre-
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quently engage with the trivial, quotidian, or entertaining, persons with social
or cultural knowledge and interpersonal skills—the talent, say, to tell a joke,
discuss sports, or narrate travails of childbearing and rearing—may find
themselves prized in a conversational arena. Indeed, conversational “expertise”
often is equated with the gift for eliciting and validating personal experiences
and opinions of others, even in the face of disagreement.
Additionally, whereas informal rules of conversation are familiar and accessible to most individuals, formal processes common to public deliberation
may intimidate the uninitiated in parliamentary procedure. Although conversations are not without norms, such talk unfolds spontaneously through
informal, unstated conventions of politeness linked to turn-taking; topic initiation, acceptance, and refusal; leave-taking; and so forth. Participants who
violate conventions by interrupting, monopolizing talk, or even voicing
racism or sexism, for example, seldom face the type of reprimand often
encountered in formal deliberations.
In a related vein, then, the priority placed on forging and maintaining relationships in social conversations privileges avoiding conflict, even when conversational partners violate norms or make outlandish claims. Because the
presumption of trust governs, Ronald Wardbaugh notes, “good behavior in
conversations is cooperative behavior” and confrontation becomes anathema:
challenging or “correcting others . . . directly questions an underlying assumption of conversation—that everybody is telling the truth.”21 If friction threatens or erupts, parties skirt conflict through capitulation or compromise,
silence, shifting topics, or polite physical escape.22 Even some argumentation
scholars agree that eluding discord trumps effective decision making when
talk is “conversational.” Thomas A. Hollihan and Kevin T. Baaske, for example,
counsel conversationalists to consider, “How might [a dispute] affect our relationship?” and “What good is securing a victory in an argument, if the person
[I] have argued with . . . refuses to be a friend, or comes to . . . dislike [me]?”23
Therapeutic dialogue is likewise highly personal, although such talk
directly engages with some conflict or struggle: addiction, familial strife, grief,
eating disorders, low self-esteem, or other personal or relational issues.
Therapeutic discourse—be it in encounter groups, 12-step programs, or individual counseling—travels a course of self-discovery aimed ultimately at personal, not social, reform. In therapeutic talk, the self monopolizes; the
individual is central subject, provider of evidence, and solution, even if the
“problem” entails external structures such as work-related stress or navigating
racism, sexism, or homophobia.24 Ironically, although the postmodern turn in
therapy challenges the concept of an isolated self by emphasizing identity and
knowledge as products of relational dialogue,25 some postmodern dialogic
therapists nonetheless regard external data that might contradict a client’s self-
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reports as not germane. Sheila McNamee, for example, terms as “monologic”
rather than her preferred “dialogic” the “modernist belief that we can objectively assess a person, a situation, or a relationship based on the notion that
there are (or could be) some clear standards for evaluation. . . . .The discourse
of reason is so commonplace” that “[w]e simply expect others to be able to
provide rational and objective evidence supporting their claims.”26
To be sure, certain conventional boundaries between public and private
forms of communication and problem solving are artificial; deliberation over
facts, values, and courses of action inhere in essentially all human decision
making, whether it be over foreign policy or navigating daily life. So, too, some
rhetorical scholars, myself included, have noted that some rhetors may mobilize oppressed or politically disaffected constituencies by transferring certain
communication skills acquired in the private sphere into the public domain,
especially if the rhetor’s aims entail transforming disempowered audiences
into confident and skilled political actors.27 In fact, Campbell’s treatment of
the “rhetoric of conversation” in the talk of three historical female figures
greatly mirrors the consciousness-raising that she earlier analyzed in the
women’s liberation movement.28
Still, in important respects, received conceptions of democracy and public
deliberation stand in sharp relief to social conversations and therapeutic dialogues. First, unlike the scrupulous avoidance of conflict in social conversations, democratic argument, as Kenneth Burke contends, is necessarily an
admixture of “competition” and “cooperation.” As he argues, “Only if all
reports were in and if there were no vital questions still unanswered, could a
social body dispense with the assistance of a vocal opposition in the maturing
of our chart as to what is going on, which social functions are helpful and
which are harmful.”29 Thus, contrary to the relational harmony privileged in
social conversations, true civic deliberation fully recognizes, in Schudson’s
words, that “Democracy is deeply uncomfortable.”30 Public arguments are catalyzed by predicament or dispute, placing them at odds with the social convention prescribing divisive issues such as politics and religion as off-limits in
“polite conversation.”
Rather than developing relationships of equality, the conversational privileging of affective criteria over reasonable problem solving in public deliberations can invite, as I have said, what Janis terms “groupthink.” Among the
primary contributors to groupthink, explains Janis, is the goal of group cohesiveness. To maintain the god-term of “community,” self-appointed group
mindguards paint dissenters as disloyal or uncooperative, limit future membership to like-minded individuals, and frame out-group opposition as too
evil, ignorant, or unintelligent to warrant consideration. Similar to social
conversations, in groupthink, parties concerned about appearing unduly
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quarrelsome avoid conflict by denying or diluting their reservations about a
proposed action, shifting or tabling discussion of thorny topics, or resorting
to silence or physical absence. Such self-censorship, coupled with the faulty
assumption that silence equals consent, results in the illusion of unanimity.31
Although name-calling and ostracism can and do occur in traditional democratic processes, the prioritizing of group harmony and cohesiveness in conversational models grants freer license to scapegoat.
Second, democratic processes and public problem solving necessarily
diverge from social conversations by articulating objectives at the outset;
adhering to formal rules for participating in, managing, and achieving problem resolution; and documenting outcomes. Through the scrupulous recording of motions, discussions, amendments, and votes, the dynamics of such
joint action are rendered visible, accessible, and retrievable, even to persons not
party to the immediate deliberative process. “Democracies,” Schudson writes,
“put great store in the power of writing to secure, verify, and make public.
Democracies require public memories.”32 Thus, contrary to the framing of
conversation and dialogue as egalitarian public problem-solving models, they,
in truth, can reify pecking orders by licensing group members with social
authority to set agendas, steer and dominate discussion, and—absent the
polling and recording of votes—interpret the “will” of the group. Moreover,
such informal processes can reward those who speak the loudest, the longest,
are the most articulate, or even the most recalcitrant. Freeman’s analysis of
consciousness-raising groups is instructive:
At any small group meeting anyone with a sharp eye and an acute ear can tell
who is influencing whom. The members of the friendship group will relate more
to each other than to other people. They listen more attentively, and interrupt
less; they repeat each other’s points and tend to give in amiably; they tend to
ignore or grapple with the “outs” whose approval is not necessary for making a
decision . . . They are nuances of interaction, not prewritten scripts. But they are
discernible, and they do have their effect. Once one knows . . . whose approval is
the stamp of acceptance, one knows who is running things.33

As a result, Freeman argues that purportedly “structureless” organizations
are a “deceptive . . . smokescreen,” given that “‘structurelessness’ does not prevent the formation of informal structures, but only formal ones . . . For everyone to have the opportunity to be involved . . . and to participate . . . the
structure must be explicit, not implicit. The rules of decision-making must be
open and available to everyone, and this can only happen if they are formalized.”34 Schudson likewise argues that the inherently “threatening” nature of
political deliberation demands procedures guaranteeing “equal access to the
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floor, equal participation in setting the ground rules for discussion, and a set
of ground rules designed to encourage pertinent speaking, attentive listening,
appropriate simplifications, and widely apportioned speaking rights.”35
Third, whereas in social and therapeutic talk, personal experience, opinion,
and individual well-being reign supreme, the force of “opinion” in a democracy demands allegiance both to reasonableness and to the larger collective
good. Unlike certain postmodern dialogic therapists, responsible public deliberators view neither facts as inescapably elusive nor appeals to the rational
uniformly suspect. Rather, democratic arguers apply rigorous standards for
evidence and, above all, writes Schudson, subscribe to “norms of reasonableness.”36 A key groupthink feature—uncritical, self-righteous faith in the
group’s inherent morality and traditions—is nourished by privileging lived
experiences and personal opinions, the primary content of social and therapeutic talk. As Donal Carbaugh points out, because the “self ” becomes the
“locus of conversational life,” conversationalists may “disprefer consensual
truths, or standards of and for public judgment,” which they view to “unduly
constrain ‘self.’”37 Such an egocentric focus can enable members of deliberative
bodies to discount crucial, formal types of external evidence that counters
existing personal and group assumptions, resulting in what Lisa M. GringPemble characterizes as forming public policies such as welfare reform “by
anecdote.”38
Fourth, a communicative model that views public issues through a relational, personal, or therapeutic lens nourishes hegemony by inviting political
inaction. Whereas the objective of conventional public argument is achieving
an instrumental goal such as a verdict or legislation, the aim of social conversation generally stops with self-expression. As Schudson puts it, “Conversation
has no end outside itself.”39 Similarly, modeling therapeutic paradigms that
trumpet “talking cures” can discourage a search for political solutions to public problems by casting cathartic talk as sufficient remedy. As Campbell’s
analysis of consciousness-raising groups in the women’s liberation movement
points out, “[S]olutions must be structural, not merely personal, and analysis
must move beyond personal experience and feeling . . . Unless such transcendence occurs, there is no persuasive campaign . . . [but] only the very limited
realm of therapeutic, small group interaction.”40
Finally, and related, a therapeutic framing of social problems threatens to
locate the source and solution to such ills solely within the individual, the
“self-help” on which much therapy rests. A postmodern therapeutic framing
of conflicts as relational misunderstandings occasioned by a lack of dialogue
not only assumes that familiarity inevitably breeds caring (rather than, say,
irritation or contempt) but, more importantly, provides cover for ignoring the
structural dimensions of social problems such as disproportionate black
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poverty. If objective reality is unavoidably a fiction, as Sheila McNamee claims,
all suffering can be dismissed as psychological rather than based in real, material circumstance, enabling defenders of the status quo to admonish citizens to
“heal” themselves.
Below, various exemplars of public interactions and decision-making
processes couched as “conversations” and “dialogues” expose the promotion of
these private communication models as balm for the inequities, discord, and
inertia of civic life as often more romantic than realistic, what Burke might
term an “idealistic lie.”41 As importantly, such cases illustrate his contention
that ostensible “cures” for social problems often “take on the quality of the disease.”42 Indeed, rather than remedying exclusion, hierarchy, polarization, and
inertia in civic life, the appropriation of conversation and dialogue into the
public realm can foster and sustain such problems.

CONVERSATION AND DIALOGUE AS EXCLUSIVE AND SILENCING
Despite the valorization of public conversation and dialogue as egalitarian,
various public endeavors packaged as conversations and dialogues reveal a
coopting of the terms as a means to consolidate rather than neutralize power,
a move accompanied by groupthink traits. Particularly conspicuous is
Clinton’s aforementioned Conversation on Race, an initiative purportedly
designed to tackle vexing racial discord by engaging citizens of diverse opinions and racial backgrounds in open dialogue. In a speech inaugurating this
“great and unprecedented conversation about race,” Clinton broached the
enduring controversy over affirmative action by invoking purported conversational tenets of tolerance and inclusion:
To those who oppose affirmative action, I ask you to come up with an alternative. I would embrace it if I could find a better way. And to those of us who support it, I say we should continue to stand for it, [but] we should reach out to those
who disagree or are uncertain and talk about the practical impact of these issues,
and we should never be unwilling to work with those who disagree with us.43

Yet, from the outset, Clinton’s appointed seven-member advisory board on
the Conversation on Race was noticeably insular, entirely composed, for example, of supporters of affirmative action.44 So, too, commission chair John Hope
Franklin summarily dismissed demands by Native Americans for representation on the board as well as the hope voiced by a fellow board member, Asian
American Angela Oh, at the panel’s first meeting to move the racial dialogue
beyond a “black-white paradigm.” Contending the board would become too
cumbersome if it were more racially and ethnically diverse, the accomplished
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black historian also offered a selective reading of the nation’s racial past: “[T]his
country cut its eyeteeth on racism with black-white relations. They didn’t do
it with Native Americans, they did it on black-white relations. . . . And we
have to go by this.”45 Franklin likewise played mindguard by refusing even to
hear testimony from opponents of affirmative action, invoking the conversational paradigm as justification. “I make a distinction between a dialogue and
a debate,” he said. “A debate almost by its very definition suggests controversy,
wild and wide differences of opinion, and I must say, I’m not interested in
that.”46 A senior Clinton administration official working with the panel
defended its ideological homogeneity by saying, “The point of the committee is
to help formulate White House policy. So why should we appoint people who
disagree with the President? Why hear testimony from people who disagree
with him?”47 And reportedly doors were shut and whites kept away from a
commission-sanctioned Dallas community meeting led by a Clinton cabinet
member.48
Other groupthink traits also featured prominently in the Conversation on
Race. Franklin, White House spokespersons, and the commission’s senior
advisor, Christopher Edley Jr., implicitly or overtly cast opposition as unduly
quarrelsome, uncooperative, self-serving, polarizing, and even criminal, a discrediting tactic Janus argues stems from a group’s self-righteousness. Franklin,
for example, couched prospective dissent from outside as uncivil—“recrimination and sniping”—and warned that he expected anyone granted a hearing
“not to scream that affirmative action is bad.” White House Press Secretary Joe
Lockhart contended that critics charging Franklin with running a tightly
scripted “monologue” rather than the promised dialogue “are playing partisan
politics and trying to set up racially motivated wedge issues for [the] 1998
[election].”49 Most vitriolic were charges by Edley, empowered to write the
panel’s final report, that Abigail and Stephen Thernstrom’s book criticizing
affirmative action constituted “a crime against humanity.”50
The deleterious self-censorship common to groupthink also constrained
the board leading the national dialogue from engaging in a real dialogue
among themselves, despite Clinton’s promise that the conversation would be
probing and infused with disagreement. As board member Governor Thomas
Kean said, “When you get a very sensitive issue like race, you don’t want to
appear as if you’re fighting.51 Indeed, the board’s commitment to a veneer of
unanimity and camaraderie was evident in Oh’s revisionist version of her initial televised exchange with Franklin—punctuated with repeated interruptions of each other—over the racial and ethnic scope of the Conversation on
Race. “From the first day of the Board,” she said in a later interview, “the media
manufactured a conflict between John Hope and me . . . John Hope did not
disagree with me at all.”52

TAKING CONVERSATION, DIALOGUE, AND THERAPY PUBLIC

415

Even in its initial few days, British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s Big
Conversation likewise evinced groupthink traits emulating Clinton’s
Conversation on Race, including exclusiveness, top-level orchestration, moral
certainty, and overt or implicit suggestions that dissenters, skeptics, or the
populace at large were disloyal, roguish, woefully naïve, or simply unintelligent. “The big conversation,” claimed the government’s official webpage, “is
about having a dialogue with the British people about the challenges facing
our country in the future and the right priorities in solving them.”53 From the
beginning, however, the initiative manifested an elitism that loyalists of conversational models critique as endemic in traditional deliberative processes.
Launched amid great media fanfare in Newport, Wales—a country recognized
by the Welsh Assembly as bilingual—and mere hours before Blair attended a
required review of the Good Friday Irish Peace Accord’s commitment to bilingualism in the United Kingdom, the official Big Conversation interactive website ironically operated solely in English. Inquiries into the monolingual
“conversational” website by Welsh officials was greeted by a London official’s
dismissive comment, “Can’t they speak English?” Using the groupthink tactic
of reducing complaints from the excluded to cheap maneuvers of troublemakers, a Blair spokesperson termed petitions to allow Welsh speakers to participate in their indigenous tongue as “‘making mis-chief ’” during this major
government effort at consulting the public.54 Discrediting of Big Conversation
skeptics likewise emerged in cabinet office minister Douglas Alexander’s
response to reporters’ queries about how this grand new pledge to “listen” to
the public squared with recent competing messages: Blair’s “I’ve not got a
reverse gear” speech just the previous month on unpopular issues—Iraq, proposed steep tuition hikes, and the UK’s joining the European Union—and
Home Secretary David Blunkett’s framing of Labour’s legislative agenda,
unveiled but two days before the Big Conversation’s premier, as “Not negotiable.” Invoking a devil-angel dichotomy, Alexander painted media prying
into such glaring contradictions as “everything that [is] wrong with some of
the political journalism we see today,” “a kind of gladiatorial contest rather
than a conversation.”55
Suspicions that the Big Conversation was a “Big Con” soon proved warranted. Within days, red-faced Labour officials were pressed to explain a
media report detailing how “many of the [citizen] stories on the website were
crafted by Labour officials who interviewed carefully selected individuals
known to be broadly sympathetic to Labour—and then cut out any negative
comments,” including sharp criticisms over the Iraq invasion.56 The week
before, another newspaper promptly had discovered that the first “conversation” between Blair and “the people” in a blighted neighborhood was, in
truth, a tightly scripted, invitation-only affair starring a host of Labour Party
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members, bussed-in citizens, and handpicked media, but actually closed to
local citizens and reporters.57 Compounding such embarrassments was the
accidental borrowing of the initiative’s name from a nongovernment website:
TheBigConversation.org. The blunder produced ironic results as citizen comments flooded the wrong website, “revealing a picture of public opinion that
has not been censored or retouched . . .”58 Implicit in such clumsy efforts at
control—couched in the egalitarian language of “conversation” and “dialogue”—were assumptions that the public would neither notice nor interrogate, a groupthink trait of viewing outsiders as too weak or unintelligent to
counter group power.
Exclusion cloaked in the velvet glove of civic conversation and democratic
dialogue has not been peculiar to national political leaders. Bill Moyers’s 1996
ten-week televised series Genesis: The Living Conversation exhibited similar
properties but also revealed how purveyors of public dialogues often marry
democracy to the spiritual or therapeutic. Echoing Clinton and Blair, Moyers
introduced the first episode of his religious “conversation” by emphasizing the
need for community, lamenting that “The Bible is often used as a wedge to
drive us apart.” Approaching religion “in a democratic spirit, with respect for
the person whose opinion we disagree with,” he said, might produce “some
common ground.”59 Yet, contrary to his televised claim of having “invited people of different opinions to talk about these old stories,”60 Moyers opted to
exclude Christian fundamentalists—a group currently comprising 42 percent
of the population61—from his religious conversation. Instead, he confined this
ostensibly “democratic” dialogue to theologians, novelists, poets, psychologists, and academics with progressive religious perspectives parallel to his own.
In rationalizing his select circle of like-minded conversationalists, Moyers cast
the uninvited as demented Others. Christian fundamentalists, he contended,
cling to an “alien ideology” of literal biblical interpretation, embracing beliefs
that are “less a set of ideas than . . . a pathological distemper, a militant
anger.”62 Other religious fundamentalists, though, fared far better in his
Moyers in Conversation series, aired immediately following September 11,
2001. In those conversations designed to “promote a process of healing,”
Moyers addressed “the need to cultivate pluralistic dialogue in America, the
most religiously diverse country in the world.” To that end, he offered airtime
to an American Afghanistan-born Muslim who, while not defending the massacre of American civilians, detailed the anger of Islamic fundamentalists
toward the United States, which lay behind the atrocities.63
Albeit different ventures, these public conversations followed strikingly
similar patterns. Promoted by their socially powerful architects as vehicles to
forge a coveted sense of community out of social estrangement, all masqueraded as open forums welcoming diverse opinions even as they engaged in ide-
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ological silencing on two levels. First, each employed an ideological litmus test
to control access to their public dialogues. Second, these conversations, collectively considered, framed dissent in tragic terms: uncivil, irrational, deranged,
pathological, and even criminal. But real democracy, Burke argues, requires a
comic perspective wherein opponents are seen as merely mistaken rather than
as evil, a worldview that acknowledges the “rowdiness” of public argument
that Robert L. Ivie claims is endemic in any free society.64
Particularly insidious, though, is when “conversation” and “dialogue” are
coopted to erode existing formal processes, including the ballot, a defining feature of democracy. Following years of protracted salary disputes, administrators at the University of New Hampshire in 1996 wedded the language of
therapy and dialogue in their proposal to replace the traditional legislative
Academic Faculty Senate, which they termed “dysfunctional,” with a “conversational” University Forum stripped of voting rights. “The object is to try to
find a unifying force,” said the interim president, “a way to arrive at a better
understanding of the issues, a greater freedom to speak, more emphasis on
honest discussions, rather than [on] who has the votes.” The provost concurred that “shared governance” should not be the crucial concern, stressing
that formal deliberative processes jeopardized relational priorities: “The
forum as a non-legislative body . . . offers everybody a chance to talk. . . . It’s
an opportunity for a real conversation. . . . Maybe it can rebuild trust.”65
In such talk, the most sacred guarantee of political voice in a democracy—
the ballot—is pejoratively cast in the therapeutic language of “dysfunction,”
while the effort to rescind that right is couched in the Orwellian language of
increased “freedom to speak” and “honest discussions.” Here, the crucial competitive half of the competitive-cooperative dialectical equation is factored out
in the ostensible pursuit of “unity” and “trust,” maneuvers typical of groupthink. As Burke argues, genuine democracy “institutionaliz[es] the dialectic
process, by setting up a political structure that gives full opportunity for the
use of competition to a cooperative end.” Beyond “the individual’s freedom
depend[ing] upon the traditions of the collectivity,” a mature society requires
constant self-testing through challenges, rethinking, and revision. “[T]he
dialectic process absolutely must be unimpeded,” Burke writes, “if society is to
perfect its understanding of reality by the necessary method of give-and-take
(yield and advance).”66
Moreover, deliberative bodies guided by interpersonal dynamics rather
than formal procedures can foster fear of reprisals rather than “honest discussions” or “trust.” Illustrative is Freeman’s choice to use the pseudonym
“Joreen” to critique early feminist consciousness-raising groups she likened to
“sororities” in that “people listen to others because they like them and not
because they say significant things.”67 Indeed, epidemic ostracism in those
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informal groups is the theme of Freeman’s later essay, “Trashing,” wherein she
describes ritualized character assassination thinly veiled as “therapy.”68
Beyond centralizing rather than distributing power, conversational models
can also rupture an existing sense of communal goodwill. One classroom
experience illustrates. Several years ago, I co-taught a course in feminist
rhetoric and film with a media colleague committed to collaborative learning,
empowerment, and consensus, which she defined as unanimity. Part of her
dialogic pedagogy entailed requiring the class to determine collectively the
parameters for an impending essay exam. Almost immediately, civil disagreements arose over the most germane approach, which several students sought
to resolve by proposing a vote. My colleague, however, promptly objected,
claiming both that voting historically had been a patriarchal, elitist tool and
that majority rule silenced minority perspectives. She likewise opposed my
attempt to mediate the conflict, casting faculty intervention as a top-down
encroachment. Consequently, given the refusal of a stubborn minority to surrender any ground, negotiations grew protracted, factions formed, and hostilities erupted. Deprived of means to reach formal resolution or even forge
compromise, the weary majority eventually capitulated to the will of the
inflexible few. In the end, the “consensus” reached was not only phantom but
costly. Rather than equalizing power, the process had accomplished the
reverse: concentrating and conceding control to certain individuals, those
whose recalcitrance, ironically, most violated my colleague’s dialogic ideal.
Moreover, the class never fully recuperated from the animosity occasioned by
what the majority rightly viewed as a tyranny of the few.
Still, the experience bore pedagogical fruit. At least for some, the incident
triggered a more thoughtful examination of the premise of egalitarian
empowerment underlying informal conflict resolution paradigms for public
disagreements, models that traffic uncritically in terms such as community,
dialogue, conversation, collaboration, and consensus. In so doing, they reappraised poststructuralist critiques that equate the competitive, reason-giving,
and formal traditional model for civic deliberation with divisiveness and elitism. In their own way, some acquired an inchoate appreciation for what
Schudson would later claim: “Democracy creates democratic conversation
more than conversation naturally creates democracy.”69

CONVERSATION AS IMPEDING POLITICAL ACTION
Approaching public controversies through a conversational model informed
by therapy also enables political inaction in two respects. First, an open-ended
process lacking mechanisms for closure thwarts progress toward resolution. As
Freeman writes of consciousness raising, an unstructured, informal discussion
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“leaves people with no place to go and the lack of structure leaves them with
no way of getting there.”70 Second, the therapeutic impulse to emphasize the
self as both problem and solution ignores structural impediments constraining individual agency. “Therapy,” Cloud argues, “offers consolation rather than
compensation, individual adaptation rather than social change, and an experience of politics that is impoverished in its isolation from structural critique
and collective action.” Public discourse emphasizing healing and coping, she
claims, “locates blame and responsibility for solutions in the private sphere.”71
Clinton’s Conversation on Race not only exemplified the frequent wedding
of public dialogue and therapeutic themes but also illustrated the failure of a
conversation-as-counseling model to achieve meaningful social reform. In his
speech inaugurating the initiative, Clinton said, “Basing our self-esteem on the
ability to look down on others is not the American way . . . Honest dialogue
will not be easy at first . . . Emotions may be rubbed raw, but we must begin.”
Tempering his stated goal of “concrete solutions” was the caveat that “power
cannot compel” racial “community,” which “can come only from the human
spirit.”72
Following the president’s cue to self-disclose emotions, citizens chiefly
aired personal experiences and perspectives during the various community
dialogues. In keeping with their talk-show formats, the forums showcased
what Orlando Patterson described as “performative ‘race’ talk,” “public speech
acts” of denial, proclamation, defense, exhortation, and even apology, in short,
performances of “self ” that left little room for productive public argument.73
Such personal evidence overshadowed the “facts” and “realities” Clinton also
had promised to explore, including, for example, statistics on discrimination
patterns in employment, lending, and criminal justice or expert testimony on
cycles of dependency, poverty, illegitimacy, and violence.
Whereas Clinton had encouraged “honest dialogue” in the name of
“responsibility” and “community,” Burke argues that “The Cathartic Principle”
often produces the reverse. “[C]onfessional,” he writes, “contains in itself a
kind of ‘personal irresponsibility,’ as we may even relieve ourselves of private
burdens by befouling the public medium.” More to the point, “a thoroughly
‘confessional’ art may enact a kind of ‘individual salvation at the expense of the
group,’” performing a “sinister function, from the standpoint of overall-social
necessities.”74 Frustrated observers of the racial dialogue—many of them
African Americans—echoed Burke’s concerns. Patterson, for example, noted,
“when a young Euro-American woman spent nearly five minutes of our ‘conversation’ in Martha’s Vineyard . . . publicly confessing her racial insensitivities, she was directly unburdening herself of all sorts of racial guilt feeling.
There was nothing to argue about.”75 Boston Globe columnist Derrick Z.
Jackson invoked the game metaphor communication theorists often link to
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skills in conversation,76 voicing suspicion of a talking cure for racial ailments
that included neither exhaustive racial data nor concrete goals. “The game,”
wrote Jackson, “is to get ‘rid’ of responsibility for racism while doing nothing
to solve it.”77
Contributing to the ineffectiveness of a therapeutic approach in redressing
social problems is its common pairing with what Burke terms “incantatory”
imagery, wherein rhetors invite persons to see themselves in an idealized
form.78 Comparing a current conflicted self against a future self individuals
aspire to become is a therapeutic staple, a technique Clinton mimics in his
speech on race. In one breath, he acknowledges persistent racial “discrimination and prejudice”; in another, he overtly invites audience members to picture themselves in saintly fashion: “Can we be one America respecting, even
celebrating, our differences, but embracing even more what we have in common?”79 But outside private therapy, this strategy rarely results in honest selfdisclosure, especially regarding thorny issues such as race. Andrew Hacker
argues that individuals seldom speak candidly about race in public; rather,
they express an “idealized” self with ideas and feelings they desire or, more
commonly, believe they should possess, a phenomenon evident even in anonymous polling.80 The hazard of blending the confessional with the incantatory,
Burke writes, is a “sentimental and hypocritical” false reassurance that society
is on the proper course, rendering remedial action unnecessary.81 This danger
is compounded if the problem initially has been couched as essentially attitudinal rather than structural, as Clinton did: “We have torn down the barriers
in our laws. Now we must break down the barriers in our lives, our minds and
our hearts.”82 Indeed, in commenting on the therapeutic bent of the
Conversation on Race, William L. Taylor argues that the late Bayard Rustin’s
reservations about the social-psychological approach to race were prescient:
“Rustin said he could envision America being persuaded figuratively to lie
down on the psychiatrist’s couch to examine their feelings about race. They
would likely arise, he said, pronouncing themselves either free or purged of
any bias. And nothing would have changed.”83
Furthermore, identification intrinsic in narrative experiences is doubleedged; while identification can neutralize domination by creating empathy,
identification also can fortify hegemony. As Cornell West warns, the privileging of emotional responses to racism and racial self-identities over other data
can contribute to “racial reasoning,” which blacks employ to their peril. To
illustrate, he points to the failure of black leadership to challenge the qualifications by typical measures of black Supreme Court nominee Clarence
Thomas, opting instead to submit to deceptive racial solidarity built upon
premises of “black authenticity.”84 Because the problems plaguing contemporary black America, West writes, result from a complex amalgam of structural
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and behavioral factors,85 weaving solutions demands analysis of data beyond
subjective personal narratives and performances of self-identity.
The Conversation on Race visibly demonstrates the inertia endemic in a discursive model lacking direction and mechanisms for closure. Five months into
the racial dialogue, White House aides conceded no consensus had emerged
even on fundamental goals: whether the initiative should formulate racerelated policy or merely explore racial attitudes.86 Moreover, Clinton himself
expressed weariness over the failure in public meetings to move beyond the
repetitive airing of personal opinion on issues such as affirmative action,87
concurring with critics that “we need structure for the discussion . . . so we can
actually get something done.”88 Months more of racial conversation, however,
produced few substantive results.
The University of New Hampshire’s extended dialogue over the proposed
conversational forum engendered similar fatigue and inaction. Arguments
forwarded by both camps centered on pivotal differences between “debate”
and “conversation,” problem-solving tasks and relational aims, and formal and
informal modes of gauging opinions. Ironically, more than one lengthy “conversation” over the conversational proposal produced no action, leading one
exhausted participant to observe, “This [process] goes to the heart of my frustration with ever making this [conversational Forum] viable.”89 As Burke
maintains, while some symbolic forms contain “a ‘way in,’ ‘way through,’ and
‘way out,’” others “lead us in and leave us there.” 90
Finally, a key weakness in a dialogic model for treating systemic social problems is its reliance on a crucial non-sequitur: increased intimacy will spawn an
ethic of care, which, in turn, will produce an ethic of justice.91 But at the
University of New Hampshire, the mistrust and estrangement that a “real conversation” purportedly would rectify had resulted, not from a lack of familiarity among principals, but from structural concerns, including the widening gap
between faculty and administrative salaries, shrinking resources, and maneuvers to erode faculty governance. Likewise, the personal proximity between
white families and their black slaves or servants reveals that intimacy means little in the face of structural inequities, nor does it necessarily induce removal of
injustices. Illustrative is the recent revelation that South Carolina senator Strom
Thurmond had fathered a daughter by his family’s black domestic in 1925, an
intimacy that failed to alter the 1948 Dixiecrat presidential candidate’s stance
on segregation.92 Similarly, although the lessening of hostility over abortion
reported by some participants in the Public Conversations Project may have
some merit, project leaders themselves concede their “vision for a ‘conflict resolution’ process for a complex issue [such as abortion] is not necessarily resolution.”93 As such, the utility of such dialogues on public policies affecting the
material lives of women seeking legal reproductive choices is sorely limited. As
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Burke notes when drawing crucial distinctions between psychological and
material spheres, “[T]o some degree, solution of conflict must always be done
purely in the symbolic realm (by ‘transcendence’) if it is to be done at all.” Still,
a “symbolic drama,” he writes, differs from “the drama of living . . . and [its] real
obstacles . . . Hence, at times [people] try to solve symbolically kinds of conflict
that can and should be solved by material means.”94 Indeed, as Clinton rightly
said in launching his Conversation on Race, political or military power cannot
compel caring. Yet political power can command justice as evidenced in the
nation’s record of dismantling racial and gender barriers through judicial and
legislative means.
To be sure, an ethic of care and an ethic of justice need not be mutually
exclusive.95 But precisely because therapeutic and conversational approaches
are unable to address structural problems, “conversation” and “dialogue”
should be approached with healthy suspicion when championed by those
enjoying significant power. As Freeman astutely notes, “[S]tructurelessness
becomes a way of masking power . . . and it is usually most strongly advocated
by those who are the most powerful.”96

CONCLUSION
In some cases, informal political talk akin to conversations may foster public
participation, mitigate cynicism and alienation, and nourish public deliberation. For example, an impressive number of citizens in focus groups following
the 1992 presidential debates reported renewed respect for the political process
and increased tolerance for competing perspectives. To the surprise of many,
the discussions kindled their yearning for what John Dewey might describe as
a “creative democracy”: political engagement generated by “civic conversation.”97 Still, their appraisals of the candidates and the debate process contained
an acute appreciation of key properties of conventional public deliberation: the
ability of candidates to pinpoint structural problems and articulate remedies,
to supply sufficient data and apply sound reasoning, to tackle risky issues for
the collective good, and to refrain from exploiting personal issues to credential
themselves or discredit an opponent. Participants likewise expressed a keen
sensitivity to formal rules guaranteeing some modicum of equal opportunity
for participation by the candidates.98 But although many citizens found their
talk with others enriching, these pseudo-dialogues were no substitute for their
democratic birthright: the vote. Doubtless no amount of conversation, its
alleged recuperative powers notwithstanding, would blunt outrage provoked
by unilateral disenfranchisement in the name of furthering “dialogue.”
So, too, certain aspects of a dialogic approach to public conflicts may help
bridge entrenched differences, particularly if facilitated by experts skilled in
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mediation techniques. As illustration, Senator George Mitchell himself characterized his brokering of the 1998 historic peace accord in Northern Ireland as a
“democratic dialogue,” given the unprecedented inclusion of representatives
from all warring sides.99 Yet in crucial respects, the process Mitchell oversaw
enacted the type of deliberative model Hauser and Benoit-Barne would replace
with civic “conversation.” The conventional “procedural view” of democracy,
they argue, “is prone to reducing deliberation to exchanges among an epistemic
elite credentialed to engage in critical rational deliberation. Moreover, it rules
out the impact of attachments, which motivate citizens to become involved in
political issues.”100 Yet, from the outset, the 22-month-long negotiation leading
to the treaty was highly procedural. A fixed set of ground rules for managing participation, including apportioned speaking rights, guided the difficult discussions as did six basic principles demanding that parties eschew what Hauser and
Benoit-Barne might term their “attachments” to violence. A firm deadline for
resolution was implemented and observed. And, most significantly, the final 69page document required ratification through referendum by Irish citizens.101
This widespread recognition that access to public deliberative processes
and the ballot is a baseline of any genuine democracy points to the most curious irony of the conversation movement: portions of its constituency.
Numbering among the most fervid dialogic loyalists have been some feminists
and multiculturalists who represent groups historically denied both the right
to speak in public and the ballot. Oddly, some feminists who championed the
slogan “The Personal Is Political” to emphasize ways relational power can
oppress tend to ignore similar dangers lurking in the appropriation of conversation and dialogue in public deliberation. Yet the conversational model’s
emphasis on empowerment through intimacy can duplicate the power networks that traditionally excluded females and nonwhites and gave rise to
numerous, sometimes necessarily uncivil, demands for democratic inclusion.
Formalized participation structures in deliberative processes obviously cannot
ensure the elimination of relational power blocs, but, as Freeman pointed out,
the absence of formal rules leaves relational power unchecked and potentially
capricious. Moreover, the privileging of the self, personal experiences, and
individual perspectives of reality intrinsic in the conversational paradigm mirrors justifications once used by dominant groups who used their own lives,
beliefs, and interests as templates for hegemonic social premises to oppress
women, the lower class, and people of color. Paradigms infused with the therapeutic language of emotional healing and coping likewise flirt with the type
of psychological diagnoses once ascribed to disaffected women. But as Betty
Friedan’s landmark 1963 The Feminist Mystique argued, the cure for female
alienation was neither tranquilizers nor attitude adjustments fostered through
psychotherapy but, rather, unrestricted opportunities.102
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The price exacted by promoting approaches to complex public issues—
models that cast conventional deliberative processes, including the marshaling
of evidence beyond individual subjectivity, as “elitist” or “monologic”—can be
steep. Consider comments of an aide to President George W. Bush made
before reports concluding Iraq harbored no weapons of mass destruction, the
primary justification for a U.S.-led war costing thousands of lives.
Investigative reporters and other persons sleuthing for hard facts, he claimed,
operate “in what we call the reality-based community.” Such people “believe
that solutions emerge from [the] judicious study of discernible reality.” Then
baldly flexing the muscle afforded by increasingly popular social-constructionist and poststructuralist models for conflict resolution, he added: “That’s
not the way the world really works anymore . . . We’re an empire now, and
when we act, we create our own reality. And while you’re studying that reality—judiciously, as you will—we’ll act again, creating other new realities.”103
The recent fascination with public conversation and dialogue most likely is
a product of frustration with the tone of much public, political discourse.
Such concerns are neither new nor completely without merit. Yet, as Burke
insightfully pointed out nearly six decades ago, “A perennial embarrassment in
liberal apologetics has arisen from its ‘surgical’ proclivity: its attempt to outlaw a malfunction by outlawing the function.” The attempt to eliminate flaws
in a process by eliminating the entire process, he writes, “is like trying to eliminate heart disease by eliminating hearts.”104 Because public argument and
deliberative processes are the “heart” of true democracy, supplanting those
models with social and therapeutic conversation and dialogue jeopardizes the
very pulse and lifeblood of democracy itself.
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